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Comments and Casenotes
Limitation To General Rule Of Republication
By Codicil
Colley v. Britton'
Alice H. Read died on January 17, 1954. Item 6 of her
will dated October 24, 1950 provided: "I give and bequeath
to my friend, Norma Hardy Britton, the sum of two thou-
sand ($2,000.00) dollars, . . ." Marie C. Colley was made
residuary legatee and Mrs. Britton was appointed execu-
trix. On April 11, 1953 the testatrix wrote a letter directed
to an official of the bank in which she had a safety deposit
box. The letter requested the bank to take two thousand
dollars worth of her bonds from her attorney, Mrs. Britton,
which were to be gotten from the safety deposit box, and
to send them to the United States Treasury in order to have
placed on them "'Payable on death to Norma Hardy
Britton'. This is done so that she can take the bonds im-
mediately upon my death and not have to wait for the
administration of my estate."'2 Pursuant to the authority of
this letter on May 1, 1953, the United States Government
reissued to the testatrix $2,000 in Series G bonds made
payable on death to Mrs. Britton. On April 13, 1953, the
testatrix executed a codicil to her will in which she made
additional legacies. The codicil made no express reference
to the two thousand dollar legacy to Mrs. Britton. On
March 18, 1955, Mrs. Britton filed a first and final account
in which, among other distributions, she allowed herself
$2,000.00 as per the terms of the will. The residuary
legatee, Marie C. Colley, filed a petition to set aside this
accounting alleging among other things that the payment
by the executrix, Norma Hardy Britton, to herself of the
sum of two thousand dollars was a double distribution
since Mrs. Britton had already received the sum of two
thousand dollars through the medium of United States Sav-
ings Bonds bought and held by the testatrix under the term
"'POD to Norma Hardy Britton'."' The Orphan's Court
dismissed the petition, and on appeal the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded.
The Court declared that the pecuniary legacy of $2,000.00
had been adeemed by the transfer of the bonds to Mrs.
-210 Md. 237, 123 A. 2d 296 (1956).
Ibid, 244.
8 Ibid, 242.
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Britton in the testator's lifetime.4 It further stated that
though the codicil to the will operated as a republication of
the whole will as of the date of the codicil, nevertheless, "a
codicil does not operate to revive a legacy which has been
satisfied or adeemed".5
The holding in this case with respect to the satisfaction
of a general legacy by an inter vivos gift to the legatee from
the testator is in accord with a long list of Maryland cases
on this subject.' However, it is individually significant in
that it marks the first instance in which the Court of Ap-
peals has had to consider directly the question of the effect
of a codicil upon an adeemed or satisfied legacy.
A codicil to a will draws the will down to the date of
the execution of the codicil.7 The codicil may serve simply
as an addition to an existing will or it may republish a prior
revoked will.' Where it republishes a prior revoked will
by drawing it down to the date of the execution of the
codicil, inconsistent intervening wills and codicils are re-
placed by the later codicil.9 Where the will was originally
valid and has never been revoked there have developed
several limitations to the general doctrine that a codicil
makes a will speak as of the date of the execution of the
codicil.
"Ibid, 247; but see Langdon v. Astor's Ex'rs., 10 N. Y. Super. Ct. (3 Duer)
477, 541 (1854) ; [rev'd. 16 N. Y. 9 (1857) ]:
"Although the words 'ademption' and 'satisfaction' and the corre-
sponding words 'adeem' and 'satisfy' are frequently used by Judges
and text-writers as convertible terms, having the same signification,
yet, . . ., each, in its technical application to the provisions of a will,
has a distinct and appropriate meaning; 'ademption' in its strict sense,
being predicable only of specific, and 'satisfaction' of general legacies."
1 SYKEs, MARYLAND PRAcTIcE, Probate Law and Practice (1956) Sec. 86;
also 2 WoiWs AND PHRASES, Ademption, 532.
8 Supra, n. 1, 247-&
Rhein v. Wheltle, 206 Md. 1, 109 A. 2d 923 (1954) ; Loyola College v.
Dugan, 137 Md. 545, 113 A. 81 (1921) ; Selby v. Fidelity Trust Co., 188 Md.
192, 51 A. 2d 822 (1947); Gallagher v. Martin, 102 Md. 115, 62 A. 247
(1905) ; Wallace v. DuBos, 65 Md. 153, 4 A. 402 (1886) ; see also, MiuLM
ON CoNSTuC0N OF WILLs (1927), See. 144; SYKES, to. cit. supra, n. 4;
57 Am. JuB. 1080, 1094, 1100, Wills, Secs. 1579, 1596, 1605; 69 C. J. 998, Wills,
Sec. 2199.
See notes 9-15, Wnira; Weaver v. McGonigall, 170 Md. 212, 183 A. 544
(1936) ; SYKES, op. cit. supra, n. 4, Sec. 24; MILLER, op. cit. ibid, Sec. 61;
57 Am. Jun. 428, Wills, See. 626; 68 C. J. 868, Wills, Sec. 586.
8 In Re Thomas' Estate, 220 Iowa 50, 261 N. W. 622 (1935) ; Derr v. Derr,
123 Kan. 681, 256 P. 800, 53 A. L. R. 515 (1927) ; Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21,
113 S. E. 873 (1922) ; 68 C. J. 867, Wills, See. 585; 57 Am. JuR. 340, 420,
Wills, Sees. 488, 613.
9 In re Cazaurang's Estate, 42 Cal. App. 2d 796, 110 P. 2d 138 (1941)
In re Cambell's Will, 170 N. Y. 84, 62 N. E. 1070 (1902) ; Derr v. Derr, ibid,
n. 8; Austin v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 343 Ill. 406, 175 N. E. 554
(1931) ; Loyola College v. Dagan, supra, n. 6.
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An early Maryland decision adopted the general rule
that a codicil republished the will so as to make it speak as
of the date of the codicil"0 and the subsequent decisions
have reaffirmed the rule with almost formulaic applica-
tion.1 Upon the hearing of the instant case, the time was
ripe for the imposition of limitations upon the general rule
in accordance with decisions in other jurisdictions where
such limitations had already been recognized.
Originally this doctrine developed out of the efforts of
English courts to enable a devisee to take lands which had
been acquired by the testator subsequent to the execution
of the will but prior to the making of a codicil. The result
was conditioned upon the requirement that such lands be
embraced within the description given by the terms of the
original devise.12 In 1750 the doctrine was extended to per-
mit after acquired lands to pass by codicillary republica-
tion even though the codicil referred only to the legacies in
the will.13 The doctrine reached full maturity in 1792, when
it was held that the mere execution of a codicil republished
the will as of the date of the codicil unless a contrary inten-
tion was therein shown. 4 The net result of these early
cases suggested that the date of the codicil was the point
of reference to be used when construing the language of
the will.
The primary reason for the development of the doctrine
disappeared in 1837 when the English Statute of Wills per-
mitted after acquired lands to pass under an original de-
vise, the terms of which were broad enough to include the
after acquired property. 5 This result was produced by a
rule of construction that the will was to be construed at the
death of the testator for devises and bequests of a general
nature.
As if in anticipation of the development of the doctrine
of codicillary republication, in 1698 an English court de-
clared that a presumption of satisfaction of a legacy by an
inter vivos gift from the testator could not be rebutted by
"words of ratifying and confirming... though they amount
10 Jones v. Earle, 1 Gill. 395, 400 (Md., 1843):
"The will and the codicil constitute one instrument; and the codicil
revoking, in terms, a portion of the will, has -the effect to republish the
will as of the date of the codicil, .... "
"'Gilmer v. Aldridge, 154 Md. 632, 637, 141 A. 377 (1928) ; Weaver v.
McGonigall, 170 Md. 212, 183 A. 544 (1936) ; Syfer v. Dolby, 182 Md. 139,
32 A. 2d 529 (1943) ; Lederer v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 182 Md. 422, 35 A.
2d 166 (1943).
12Archerly v. Vernon, 1 Comyns. 381, 92 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1724).
1 Gibson v. Rogers, 1 Ambl. 93, 27 Eng. Rep. 58 (1750).
14 Barnes v. Crow, 4 Bro. Ch. 2, 29 Eng. Rep. 747 (1792).
B7 Wm. IV & 1 Vict. c. 26 (1837).
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to a new publication, being only words of form, and declare
nothing of the testator's intent in this matter". 6 One year
after the passage of the Wills Act this limitation upon the
doctrine of codicillary republication with respect to the
revival of revoked, adeemed or satisfied legacies was re-
affirmed in England." The ensuing one hundred years saw
additional limitations placed upon the general doctrine
whenever a strict application of the general rule would
defeat the testator's intentions." In 1907 a charitable be-
quest which had been republished by a codicil within a
statutory period of invalidation was sustained, the court
saying with respect to the general doctrine, ". . . it is equally
well settled that there are limits to the doctrine. The rule
is subject to the limitation that the intent of the testator is
not to be defeated." The court went on to say that the doc-
trine should be applied "not as a rigid formula or technical
rule, but as a useful and flexible instrument for effectuating
a testator's intentions". 9 It would seem as though recent
English cases consider the limitation on the doctrine first
and then apply the doctrine only if it will carry out the
testator's intent.20
The acceptance of limitations to the general doctrine
of codicillary republication of valid wills has had a parallel
growth in the United States. As in England, almost as soon
as the doctrine was established it began to be qualified.
Various state courts have held that the republication of a
valid will by a codicil will not rebut the presumption of an
advancement to the testator's child2 nor will it revive an
"Izard v. Hurst, 2 Freem. 223, 22 Eng. Rep. 1173, 1174 (1698). Here,
however, the presumption of satisfaction was raised by the fact that the
testator was in loco parentia to the legatee.
17 Powys v. Mansfield, 3 My. & Cr. 359, 376, 40 Eng. Rep. 964, 971 (1837).
"It is very true that a codicil republishing a will makes the will
speak as from its own date for the purpose of passing after-purchased
lands, but not for the purpose of reviving a legacy revoked, adeemed, or
satisfied. The codicil can only act upon the will as it existed at the
time; and, at the time, the legacy revoked, adeemed, or satisfied formed
no part of it. Any other rule would make a codicil, merely republish-
ing a will, operate as a new bequest, . . "
" Rolfe v. Perry, 3 De. G. J. & S. 481, 46 Eng. Rep. 722 (1863) ; Hopwood
v. Hopwood, 7 H. L. C. 728, 11 Eng. Rep. 290 (1859) ; In re Elcom, 1 Ch. 303
(1893) ; In re Moore, 1 Ir. Law R. 315 (1907) ; Re Heaths Will Trusts,
1 A. E. Rep. 199 (1949); In re Hardyman, Ch. 287 (1925); Berkeley v.
Berkeley, 2 A. E. Rep. 154 (1946).
1' In re Moore, ibid, 318.
1 In re Hardyman, supra, n. 18. A bequest to a wife who predeceased the
testator was held to apply to the second wife upon republication of a
codicil because it appeared the testator so intended. Re Heath's Will Trusts,
aupra, n. 18. A restraint on a bequest was allowed even though a codicil
republished the will after a statute had invalidated all such restraints since
this appeared to be the testator's true intent.
2Paine v. Parsons, 14 Pick. 318 (Mass., 1833).
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adeemed or satisfied legacy.22 It was reasoned that the
codicil republished the legacy but in its adeemed or satisfied
state. The instant case is in line with these holdings.
Subsequent decisions started employing the language of
the English courts in describing limitations to the doc-
trine.28 Thus, speaking with regard to the rule that the
codicil makes the will speak as of the date of the codicil, a
Pennsylvania court said in 1916:
".... this rule is not absolute; it does not apply in
every case and for all purposes; nor does it, of necessity,
alter the construction of the will, its original date still
being a factor for purposes of construction and inter-
pretation. Moreover, the rule is subject to the limita-
tion that the intention of the testator must not be de-
feated thereby. '24
More interesting, however, has been the lack of uni-
formity among the states in recognizing limitations to the
general doctrine in certain classes of cases. For example,
with respect to situations involving the lapse of a devise or
bequest where anti-lapse statutes have been enacted, sev-
eral states, including Maryland, have unequivocally denied
the operation of these statutes where there has been a re-
publication by a codicil after the death of the devisee or
legatee, concluding that the legacy, given to a dead person,
is void, and not lapsed.25 Conversely, several state courts
have held the descendents of a legatee who was dead when
the codicil was made but living at the execution of the
will took by force of an anti-lapse statute.26  There is
1Langdon v. Astor's Executor, 16 N. Y. 9 (1857) ; Alsop's appeal, 9 Pa.
St. Rep. 374 (1848) ; Trustees Unitarian Society v. Tufts, 151 Mass. 76, 23
N. E. 1006 (1890) ; Tanton v. Keller, 167 Ill. 129, 47 N. E. 376 (1897) ; Hayes
v. Welling, 38 R. I. 553, 96 A. 843 (1916) ; Howze v. Mallet, 57 N. C. 194,
197 (1858). "In other words, the legacy stands in the will; but it stands
there as a satisfied legacy." 68 C. J. 870, Wills, See. 587.
Lansdale v. Dearing, 351 Mo. 356, 173 S. W. 2d 25, 29 (1943) ; Hourigan
v. McBee, 130 S. W. 2d 661 (Mo. App. 1939) ; Mass. Audubon Soc. v. Orman
Viii. Imp. Ass'n., 152 Fla. 1, 10 So. 2d 494 (1942); In re Edwards' Estate,
254 Pa. 159, 98 A. 879 (1916).
"In re Edwards' Estate, ibid, 882.
U Billingsley v. Tongue, 9 Md. 575 (1856); Weaver v. McGonigall, 170
Md. 212, 183 A. 544 (1936) ; Gibbons v. Ward, 115 Ark. 184, 171 S. W. 90
(1914) ; Dunn v. Kearney, 288 Ill. 49, 123 N. E. 105 (1919) ; In re Mathews'
Estate, 176 Cal. 576, 169 P. 233 (1917), noted in 6 Calif. L. R. 312 (1918),
and 31 Harv. L. R. 901 (1918) ; Matter of Bradley, 119 Misc. 2, 194 N. Y. S.
888 (1922) ; Rippel v. King, 126 N. J. Eq. 297, 8 A. 2d 777 (1939). See also:
57 Am. Jun. Wills, 420, Sec. 614 and 146 A. L. R. 1366.
2Twitty v. Martin, 90 N. C. 646 (1884) ; Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520,
81 N. E. 248 (1907) ; Ex parte Newton, 183 S. C. 379, 191 S. E. 59 (1937) ;
In re Pearson's Estate, 211 Pa. 183, 60 A. 585 (1905) ; Re Gibbons, 192 Okla.
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strong support for the latter position in Schouler's text
on wills. 27
In construing legacies to charities, the courts have also
had a tendency to avoid the general doctrine where republi-
cation would avoid the legacy. In these situations the
courts have refused to permit the will to speak automatic-
ally as of the date of the codicil and give more weight to
the probable intention of the testator as gathered from the
surrounding circumstances. 2s This problem generally arises
in states which have statutes prohibiting such gifts with-
in a certain period prior to the testator's death.2" It does
appear, however, that where the codicil within the pro-
hibited time period would have the effect of increasing a
legacy for charitable purposes, such increase would be
denied. 0 It appears once again that the intention of the
testator overrides any mechanical application of the doc-
trine of codicillary republication.
The execution of a codicil after a statute has intervened
to change the law under which the will was originally
executed raises the issue of the application of the general
rule. Generally it is held that a statute passed after the
execution of the will, may be made applicable by the execu-
tion of a codicil to the will after the statute has taken
effect." There is dictum in a Maryland case suggesting the
378, 137 P. 2d 928, 146 A. L. R. 1361 (1943). See also: In re Hardyman,
aupra, n. 18; Perkins v. Micklethwaite, 1 P. Wins. 274, 24 Eng. Rep. 386
(1714).
" 1 SCHOULEE ON WILLS, EXHOUTORS AND ADMINIsTRATORS (6th ed., 1923),
Sec. 684, criticizing the application of codicillary republication to a lapsed
legacy, ". . . although a codicil usually republishes a will still it will not
do so where the effect of republishing is to render void a legacy otherwise
valid . . ."
2In re Morrow's Estate, 204 Pa. 479, 54 A. 313 (1903) ; In re McCauley's
Estate, 138 Cal. 432, 71 Pac. 512 (1903) ; In re Pence's Estate, 117 Cal. App.
323, 4 P. 2d 202 (1931) ; Appeal of Carl, 106 Pa. 635 (1884) ; In re Darling-
ton's Estate, 289 Pa. 297, 137 A. 268 (1927) ; In re Bingaman's Estate, 281
Pa. 497, 127 A. 73 (1924).
California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, New York and Pennsyl-
vania have such statutes.
9 Lightner's Appeal, 57 Pa. Super. 469 (1914).
IEaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 286, 91 A. 196 (1914). A codicil, executed
after repeal of a statute against perpetuities, validated a devise which was
void under the statute; Brimmer v. Sohier, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 118 (1848). A
codicil after the passage of the statute brought the will within the opera-
tion of the statute so as to pass after acquired lands; In re Greenberg's
Estate, 261 N. Y. 474, 185 N. E. 704, 87 A. L. R. 833 (1933). A codicil
executed after the effective date of a statute creating a right of election
under intestacy law permitted wife to renounce a nominal bequest in prior
will; Ayres v. The Methodist Church &c., 5 N. Y. Super. Ct. (3 Sandf.) 351
(1849). Devise to a corporation made invalid by operation of a statute
passed after execution of will but before making of codicil.
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possibility of a similar result in this state.32 On the other
hand, there is authority that, if the testator's intention
would be defeated by the application of the doctrine, the
codicil does not have the effect of making the will subject
to the provision of an intervening statute.33 This view was
recently endorsed by an English court which refused to
invalidate restraints on the alienation of a devise though
such restraints were declared invalid by a statute taking
effect after the execution of the will but before the making
of a codicil. 4
An examination of the text authorities reveals a general
agreement that the intention of the testator should govern
the application of the general rule that the codicil makes
the will speak as of the date of execution of the codicil."8
With respect to limitations on the general rule of republica-
tion of a will by a codicil, the Colley case is a sound and well
reasoned decision in line with prior English and state court
decisions. It has taken the initial step toward possible
further limitations. DAVID H. GILBERT
8 Weaver v. McGonigall, supra, n. 25, 218:
... conceding that the execution of the codicil... was a republica-
tion of the original will, and that by virtue of the codicil the effect of
section 335A was made applicable to the will . . ."
MmIn Harrison's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 45 (1901). An intervening anti-
lapse statute was not made operative upon a prior will by a subsequent
codicil because the intention of the testator as gathered from both -the will
and codicil would have been defeated.
" Re Heath's Will, 1 A. E. Rep. 199 (1949). cf. Coale v. Smith, 4 Pa. St.
Rep. 376 (1846) where debts, incurred after the execution of a will which
discharged indebtedness but before the codicil, were also discharged.
31 SOHOULER, WILLS, ExEcuTORs AND ADMINISTRATORs (6th ed., 1923),
Sec. 679:
"The general effect of republication is to make a new will at the date
of republication; to bring the old will down to the new date and make
it speak from that subsequent time, but this is no technical rule to over-
ride the true intent of the transaction and its force is limited ac-
cordingly."
BAGBY, MARYLAND LAW OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (2d ed., 1927),
Sec. 119 (with respect to the Maryland anti-lapse statute). ATKINSON,
WILLS (2d ed., 1953), 468:
"When a will is republished by codicil, this had the effect of making
the will speak as of the date of the codicil, though, according to the
modern and better view, this doctrine should be applied only in the
cases where a reasonable result in accordance with ,the testator's prob-
able intention is reached thereby."
1 JARMAN, WILLS (8th ed., 1930), 218:
"... yet this rule is subject to the limitation that the intention of
the testator be not defeated thereby. If, therefore, the testator In
making his will, obviously means its provisions to apply to a state of
circumstances existing at its date, republication will not make its pro-
visions apply to the state of circumstances existing at the date of
the codicil."
1 WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS (12th ed., 1930), 119; see also Evans, Testa-
mentary Republication, 40 Harv. L. R. 71 (1926) ; 57 Am. JuR. 428, Wills,
Sec. 626; 68 C. J. 868, Wills, Secs. 586-590; 69 C. J. 52, Wills, Sec. 1118.
